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I. INTRODUCTION
End-to-end packet delivery in the Internet is achieved
through a system of interconnections between the network
domains of independent entities called Autonomous Systems
(ASes). Inter-domain connections are the result of a complex,
dynamic process of negotiated business relationships between
pairs of ASes. We present an economically-principled genera-
tive model for Autonomous System graph connectivity. While
there is already a large literature devoted to understanding
Internet connectivity at the AS level, many of these models
are either static or based on generalized stochastics.
In a thoughtful critique of such models, Li, Alderson, Doyle
and Willinger [10] show that while many generative models
reproduce certain statistical features of the AS graph, they fail
to capture the good performance of realistic networks [10].
In a study of the AS’s intra-domain graph, Li, Alderson,
Willinger and Doyle [11] deﬁne performance instead in terms
of network throughput and show that it is very unlikely that
randomized generative models will yield graphs that have the
highly-optimized structure of real-world networks. The goal
of this paper is to provide insight into the economic drivers
that yield, over time, the rich and complex AS interconnection
patterns that constitute today’s Internet.
Notable features of our model include the assignment of AS
business models with an asymmetric gravity model of inter-
domain trafﬁc demand [3], an explicit representation of AS
utility that incorporates beneﬁts for trafﬁc routed, congestion
costs, and payments between ASes, and a deterministic process
for link revision that can cascade throughout the network. This
is the ﬁrst attempt at AS graph modeling that incorporates a
diffusion process to capture how ASes respond to direct and
indirect externalities from changes in the network structure,
which brings it closer to an equilibrium model.
We validate our model against other generative models.
To do this, we deﬁne the social planner’s problem which
is parameterized by the business models of the graph and
provide a method to compare earlier generative models with
our model by optimizing the placement of business models
on the network. We ﬁnd that our model yields graphs that are
better performing as compared to other dynamic generative
models. We also show that our model yields a structured place-
ment of nodes endogenously, where this placement of nodes
generally reﬂects ASes’ business models. This is some of the
ﬁrst evidence of the signiﬁcance of the business competitive
landscape in determining the structure of the AS graph.
A. Related Work
Previous economically-principled models [1], [7] have been
formulated as game-theoretic models with static equilibria,
which makes it difﬁcult to understand the graph’s evolution
over time. Moreover, these models assume homogeneous or
identical ASes, that edges have uniform costs or capacities,
and hinge on ﬁxed demand models.
Chang et al.’s [4] formulation of an AS’s decision prob-
lem uses an empirically-motivated demand model previously
introduced in [3], which we also employ. Our model differs
from theirs in that our utility function is explicit about the
economic tradeoffs at play and our model does not involve
any randomization beyond the sampling of business models,
which is tuned here to empirically-measured distributions.
While Chang et al.’s model also allows for the revision of
links, each AS revises its links when a periodic “timer” goes
off. Their method of link revision does not cascade throughout
the network as ASes react to their neighbors’ link revisions,
as is provided in our diffusion process.
II. THE AS GRAPH FORMATION MODEL
Our model contains the following components: each node
is assigned a business model, trafﬁc demands are computed
using an asymmetric gravity model, a utility function that
incorporates beneﬁts for trafﬁc routed, congestion costs, and
payment transfers between ASes, and revision of links using
a forest ﬁre diffusion model.
In our model, AS nodes come into contact with other nodes
and lay down links to maximize their economic beneﬁts. Our
model only considers customer-provider links and where the
decision to establish a link is always initiated by the customer,
who pays the provider for the link and essentially for access
to the rest of the network. The joint actions of customers
choosing their providers deﬁnes a directed graph reﬂecting the
customer-provider business relationships between ASes, with
edges from customers to providers. While link payments are
one-sided, trafﬁc ﬂows in both directions since the customer
pays for transit trafﬁc to and from its providers.
Inter-domain trafﬁc demand is tied to ASes’ respective2
customer bases. We capture this by a model given by Chang,
Jamin, Mao and Willinger [3], assigning each node a business
model according to their distribution from empirical data and
deﬁning trafﬁc demands based on these. Generally speaking,
a customer AS’s utility for connecting to a provider AS’s
domain is a function of how that connection will affect its own
customers’ trafﬁc demand, the link’s impact on its links and
network congestion, and ﬁnally on the balance of payments
made and received by it for routing trafﬁc along all of its
adjacent customer-provider connections.
A. Overview of the Dynamic Process
As nodes arrive in the network, they are given a business
model that is chosen randomly from a joint distribution [3].
A newly born node chooses to connect to the existing AS
inter-domain graph by picking the single AS provider that my-
opically maximizes its utility function. The dynamic process
unfolds in discrete periods as follows.
The Dynamic Process:
1) In period t, a single AS node is born with business attributes
< αi,βi,γi >
2) The newly born AS proceeds to place a single link to maximize
its utility, indicating who will be its provider
3) The new node’s provider then has the occasion to revise its links.
It can either lay down a single additional provider link, replace
any number of it current provider links or delete provider links
based on the action that maximizes its utility.
4) If the new node’s provider decides to make a change, then each of
its providers has the occasion to do the same. Likewise, for each
of these providers that make a change, each of their providers
have occasion to do the same also. This process burns through the
graph in a depth ﬁrst search manner, backtracking when revision
stops on a particular branch.
In what follows, let N denote the set of nodes with n =
|N|. The action of a node i ∈ N is a vector si ∈ {0,1}n
indicating which nodes i has chosen as its providers. We let
s = s1 × · · · × sn be the joint action of all nodes.
B. The Graph
The joint action s deﬁnes a directed graph G(s) =
(N,E(s)). An edge e = (i,j) ∈ E(s) is established if and
only if si(j) = 1 and designates that i is a customer of
j, which is to say that i pays j for the link. Let Ei(si) =
{(i,j)|si(j) = 1} be the set of node i’s provider links, with
E(s) = ∪i∈NEi(si). Moreover, let Eu
i (s) = {(i,j) : si(j) =
1} ∪ {(j,i) : sj(i) = 1} refer to all edges adjacent to i.
C. AS Business Models
An AS’s business model reﬂects its utility for incoming
and outgoing trafﬁc, as well as its disutility for routing
trafﬁc through its domain. We follow the business model
representation of Chang et al. [3]. Formally, each node
i ∈ N has a business model parameterized with coefﬁcients
(αi,βi,γi) ∈ (0,1]3 where αi reﬂects AS i’s demand for
inbound trafﬁc and βi reﬂects its demand for outbound trafﬁc.
The parameter γi captures an AS’s relative capacity to be
an effective inter-domain access provider. A high value of
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Fig. 1: Degree Distribution for our AS graph model compared to that of the preferential
attachment graph model
γi suggests that i is an effective provider. We can think of
the business model parameters (αi,βi,γi) as representing an
AS’s utility for providing residential access, web hosting, and
business access services, respectively. The business model
coefﬁcients (αi,βi,γi) are chosen from the joint distribution
F(a,Σ), where a refers to the distribution of γi, which is
currently drawn from an empirically-derived power law. Since
business model coefﬁcients are highly correlated in real-life,
we use an empirically-derived pairwise correlation matrix Σ to
compute αi and βi. Once business models have been assigned,
we compute trafﬁc demands based on an asymmetric gravity
model (from Chang et al. [3]).
The trafﬁc demand is represented by the matrix B(G(s))
and entry bkl(s) represents the total demand for trafﬁc from
k to l. We assume that all trafﬁc is routed. The routing policy
determines the value of xkl
e (s) for all e ∈ E and all pairs
of k,l ∈ N, where xkl
e (s) is deﬁned as the ﬂow of trafﬁc
originating from k and destined for l traveling along edge e
and assume that no packets are dropped by ASes. We assume
that routing policy designates a single path from source to sink
along which to route trafﬁc. We denote Pkl(G(s)) as the path
that the routing policy designates to send trafﬁc from k to l.
Therefore, we have
x
kl
i,j(s) =
￿
bkl(s) if (i,j) ∈ Pkl(G(s))
0 otherwise. (1)
The routing policy that we use is the “No Valley and Prefer
Customer” Routing Algorithm [6], which is closer to the way
trafﬁc is routed on the real AS graph as opposed to shortest
path routing.
D. The Utility Function
Given the set of nodes N, with corresponding business
models, the graph G(s) of inter-domain connections and trafﬁc
demand matrix bkl(s) ∈ B(s), the utility of an AS node i is
as follows:
ui(s) =
X
j∈N
b
ij(s) +
X
j∈N
b
ji(s) − τi ·
X
e∈Ei(s)
X
k,l∈N
x
kl
e (s)
−
X
j:(i,j)∈Ei(s)
tij(s) +
X
j:(j,i)∈Ej(s)
tji(s)
The third term represents the congestion cost associated
with trafﬁc routed through node i, while the last two terms rep-3
resent transfers between AS i and its customers and providers.
Recall that Eu
i (s) designates all edges adjacent to i. Note that
this is a cost τi applied to all trafﬁc ﬂow through i, capturing
i’s cost for routing inbound and outbound trafﬁc as well as
for all transit trafﬁc.
ASes with lower transit routing costs in turn provide more
affordable and more reliable service to customer domains,
making them the preferred inter-domain access providers. The
price charged to a customer AS, j, by the provider AS, i, is
modeled as a function of the congestion associated with trafﬁc
being routed through i’s servers and sub-domains as well as a
mark-up for the bilateral trafﬁc ﬂow along the purchased link.
We assume that the mark-up on trafﬁc from costs incurred
is separable from price of ﬂow on a link. That j should pay
for trafﬁc in both directions is how most customer-provider
arrangements are made, reﬂecting the fact that j is paying i
for access to the rest of the AS graph network.
We stress that λi and µi are a function of i’s identity,
both terms relating to i’s effectiveness as an access provider,
and that they are customer-anonymous, i.e. independent of
j. In practice, j’s trafﬁc demand along the proposed link
does matter in these per-unit charges. Our assumption holds
particularly well for small customers linking to much larger
providers and for the rare cases where large customers link to
relatively small providers.
An AS i’s costs for routing inter-domain trafﬁc are tied
to how its network is provisioned. Two important factors
affecting an AS’s transit costs are the length of inter-domain
links and the inter-domain bandwidth capacity. Lower transit
costs are associated with topologies with greater geographic
coverage and topologies that are optimized for larger trafﬁc
volumes. In our model, the effectiveness of i as an access
provider is captured by the coefﬁcient γi of its business model.
With this in mind, we choose parameters τi, λi and µi to
vary super-linearly in γi to reﬂect the large variability among
ASes’ prices (and presumably costs) for customer trafﬁc [4].
Precisely, for τ,λ,µ > 0 as model parameters, we have that
τq = τ · e
−γq, λq = λ · e
−γq, µq = µ · e
−γq. (2)
E. Revision of Links
Once a node lays down a link to its provider, this provider
is given the opportunity to revise its links and this process
continues recursively until no providers make a change. This
process propagates upstream from customers to providers.
Customers may add a link to a new provider, replace or
delete links to existing providers, but a provider may not add,
replace, or delete customer links. In order to make our revision
process tractable and ensure that our revision process does not
cycle, we perform a depth ﬁrst search where branches die out
once a provider decides not to make a change. The revision
of links process in our model is much like the Forest Fire
model of Leskovec et al. [9] although our revision process is
deterministic rather than randomized.
At each node in the depth ﬁrst search, a node computes
its best response function for either adding a single provider
link given the current topology of the network, deleting any
number of its provider links, or reconﬁguringits current budget
of provider links by repositioning or deleting its current links
and adding up to a single additional link to its budget.
We can analogously deﬁne a revision process with limiting
depth d, where the depth ﬁrst search revision process termi-
nates on a branch either when a node does not make a revision
or when the distance from the original node along the branch
exceeds d.
III. SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
A. Deﬁning the Performance of a Graph
Our main interest is in evaluating the relative performance
of generated graphs against those of other generative models.
We use a measure of social welfare to compare the relative
performance. In this, we follow Li et al. [10] who notice
that rule-based and purely stochastic generative models may
reproduce certain statistical features of the graph, such as
power-law degree distributions, but fail to capture important
structural features related to the performance of the graph in
question.
We deﬁne the performance of a graph as the social welfare
function W(G) =
P
i∈N ui(G). Notice that all the payments
cancel out, so this objective function is just the total demand
met by the network discounted by the congestion cost experi-
enced by all nodes.
W(G) =
X
i∈N
￿X
l∈N
bil +
X
k∈N
bki − τi ·
X
e∈Eu
i
X
k,l∈N
xkl
e
￿
(3)
This is a reasonable model of social welfare for a network
of utility-maximizing ASes.
B. Comparing Network Performance
We compare graphs generated by our generative model
(ASGM) against a number of graph topologies: preferential
attachment (PA) graphs [2], copying model (CM) graphs [8],
and graphs derived from the generalized random graph (GRG)
model [5]. In the preferential attachment generative model,
nodes are born one at a time. In each time step, with probabil-
ity p, the new node connects to a node already in the network
uniformly at random. With probability 1 − p, the new node
connects to a node already in the network in proportion to
its total degree. In the copying model, we have an out-degree
parameter k and a probability p. Much like the preferential
attachment model, nodes are born one at a time. In each time
step, the newly born node v forms d outlinks. In each time step,
a prototype vertex vp is chosen uniformly at random from the
set of nodes already in the graph. Node v then forms d outlinks
as follows. With probability p, node v’s ith outlink is chosen
uniformly at random from nodes already in the graph. With
probability 1 − p, node v’s ith outlink is chosen to be node
vp’s ith outlink. The GRG model generates random graphs
with a given expected degree sequence D = {d1,d2,...,dn}.
In the GRG model, a link is formed between nodes i and j
with probability proportional to didj.4
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Fig. 2: The (a) social welfare of our AS graphs is compared to copying model (CM), preferential attachment (PA) and generalized random graphs (GRG) as a function of the
size N of these graphs. Our model graphs with business models optimally allocated are also shown (OPT(ASG)). We also explore the space of connected network graphs having
the the same power law degree sequence in (b). The power law degree distribution against which all networks are compared is the average distribution achieved endogenously over
50 runs of our model. A pairwise rewiring procedure (described in [10]) is used to ﬁt 50 individual instances of each type of network to this degree distribution, while preserving a
simple, connected graph. Welfare values for all networks are shown, along with average performance of the original networks against the average s-metric of the rewired networks
(see bold values). (c) Business Model Coefﬁcient vs. Betweenness Centrality (d) Social Welfare and Diameter as a function of Burn Depth. Social welfare W(G) and the s-metric
value S(G) as a function of the variance of transit provider types γ. Recall that the s-metric value is a measure of a graph’s relative likelihood against a background set of graphs
with the same degree distribution. Since the degree distribution obtained endogenously by our model varies with the distribution of business models, each s-metric value in (b) is
normalized against the maximal s-metric graph for a given business model type distribution.
In Section IV, we compare graphs generated by our AS
graph model to other graphs in terms of social welfare. We
measure a graph’s performance in terms of a trafﬁc demand-
based social welfare function and the computation of trafﬁc
demands is predicated on business models, which requires us
to assign business models to preferential attachment, copying,
and GRG random graphs. We do so optimally. We ensure that
the graphs are of the same size and that the N nodes that
comprise all graphs are made up of exactly the same set of
business models. Given a set of business models and a graph,
we assign a business model to each node in the graph to
optimize the graph’s particular objective function (i.e. welfare,
demand, congestion), in the spirit of presenting all comparison
graphs in the best possible light. The trafﬁc demand model
makes this a non-linear assignment problem which we solve
by adaptive simulated annealing.
We also compare the structural features of the graphs
yielded by these generative models in Section IV. We do this
by way of the s-metric introduced by Li et al. [10]. The s-
metric measures the extent to which high-degree nodes are
connected to other high-degree nodes. A useful property of
the s-metric is that it can distinguish between graphs that have
the same degree sequence:
Deﬁnition III.1. For any graph G = (V,E) with degree
sequence D = {d1,d2,...,dn} the s-metric is deﬁned as
follows:
S(G) =
X
(i,j)∈E
didj
Since the use of the s-metric requires the same degree
sequence, we use a randomized rewiring process as in Li et
al. [10]. The s-metric also gives the likelihood of a graph,
in that given a ﬁxed degree sequence, higher S(G) values
correspond to graphs that more more likely and lower S(G)
values correspond to graphs that are less likely [10].
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we show a number of properties that our
dynamically grown graphs satisfy. In particular, we show that
our model can be parameterized so as to endogenously form
networks with a power law node degree distribution. Signif-
icantly, in stark contrast to other randomized and rule-based
topology generators, we ﬁnd that power law graphs generated
by our model bear the hallmarks of good engineering design in
terms of good congestion, throughput, and total node welfare
properties. We investigate the sensitivity of our results to
heterogeneity in the type space, showing that the empirically-
motivated choice of a yields graphs that have particular good
features and performance. We restrict our business model
distribution parametrization, in our choice of a and Σ, as per
empirical measurements in [3].
A. Power Law Networks
With the trafﬁc demand parameterized as per [3], we ob-
serve that our generated AS graphs satisfy power law degree5
distributions (as we would expect [10]), shown by approxi-
mately linear behavior on a log-log scale. Though power law
degree distributions are not unusual, they are still a key statisti-
cal property that AS graphs satisfy. Any valid AS model must
generate graphs with power law degree distributions, however
they should not be the only metric by which to judge AS graph
generative models [10]. We observe that the customer degree
distribution, the provider degree distribution and the overall
degree distribution of our dynamically generated graphs satisfy
a power law degree distribution. In Figure 1, we compare the
degree distribution of graphs from our AS graph model with
the degree distribution of graphs generated with preferential
attachment model, appropriately parameterized to yield a close
ﬁt to the total degree distribution of our model-generated
graphs, as well as to the degree distribution of preferential
attachment graphs that have been randomly rewired so as to
yield an even more precise ﬁt to the degree distribution yielded
by our model. We observe that the exponent of the customer
degree distribution is smaller (i.e. more negative) than the
exponent of the overall degree distribution, which is in turn
smaller than the exponent of the provider degree distribution,
which is what is found in practice [4].
B. Comparing Network Performance
In Figure 2(a), we ﬁnd that our AS graph generative model
yields graphs with higher social welfare than graphs generated
by the preferential attachment and copying model. Note that
this is even though business model placement is endogenous
in our graphs.
The results in Figure 2(b) yield similar results to [10], in that
graphs with high S(G) values tend to have low performance.
These set of graphs show that our model-generated graphs
fare well against all other graphs, even against copying model
graphs, which intrinsically have many more edges. This speaks
to the power of economic constraints on AS behavior to
achieve good system-wide performance, even if AS actions are
uncoordinated and myopic. That the AS graph model yields a
narrow band of networks on the likelihood scale is evidence
of a carefully engineered design.
Figure 2(b) also shows the value of the optimal business
model allocation for the ASGM graphs and we ﬁnd that the
optimal business model allocation is close in performance
to that of the ASGM graphs. We also observe that our
model reproduces, endogenously, something near the optimal,
social welfare-maximizing placement of business models in
the graph. We judge this by labeling all nodes according to
their dominant (highest value) business model coefﬁcient and
measuring a node’s location in the graph by its betweenness
centrality:
Deﬁnition IV.1. Given the graph G = (V,E), the betweenness
centrality CB(v) of a node v ∈ V is
P
s,t∈V
σst(v)
σst , where σst
refers to the number of shortest geodesic paths between s and
t, and σst(v), the number of shortest geodesic paths between
s and t that pass through node v.
Figure 2(c) shows a result regarding the average value of
the dominant business model coefﬁcient of nodes against their
betweenness centrality. It compares results for graphs derived
from our AS graph model with link revisions to our AS
graph model without link revisions. The plot suggests that
our model endogenously achieves an optimizing placement
of business models in the graph. For our model-generated
graphs, as the dominant coefﬁcient grows, business access
providers move toward the center of the graph quickest of all,
whereas residential access providers are much more likely to
be located on the fringes of the graph. The relative sensitivity
of the allocation of business models in our model to the size
of the transit provider coefﬁcient is illustrated by the sample
correlation coefﬁcient between betweenness centrality and the
three business model coefﬁcients for all nodes in the graph.
Considering over 50 network instances, we obtain correlations
of 0.33, 0.41, and 0.67 for residential access, web hosting,
and business provider coefﬁcients, respectively.
We also consider the role of the link revision process in
Figure 2(d). We plot social welfare as a function of the depth of
forest ﬁre link revision. The results of Figure 2(d) are twofold,
in that link revision is crucial to obtaining graphs with high
social welfare and that link revision is not necessary beyond
small depths. This is exactly what one would expect since the
AS graph is known to have a small diameter (between 5-7).
To reinforce this point, we have also shown the diameter of
the network as a function of the link revision depth. For all
values of link revision depth, the diameter is fairly small, but
it continues to decrease as we increase link revision depth.
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